


~~SENSITIVE~~

~~Top Secret~~

CIA/ SAVA /WVIND 724845



## WEEKLY VIETNAM INDICATORS

*Week Ending August 5 1972*



**NSA Declassification/Release Instructions on File.**

*For the President Only*

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# SOUTH VIETNAM WEEKLY INDICATORS


1968-1972  
Weekly average for each month



MAY 1972--AUGUST 1972  
Weekly data as reported


## US BATTLE DEATHS

decreased to 7 from the 8 reported last week.




## SOUTH VIETNAMESE BATTLE DEATHS

totalled 304 this week. This figure is preliminary and may change considerably as more complete information becomes available.




## INFILTRATORS DETECTED IN PIPELINE

include one special purpose and two regular groups with 1,219 personnel. The estimate of infiltrators destined for Cambodia - South Vietnam now stands at 127,700 - 129,700.




## ENEMY-INITIATED INCIDENTS

dropped to 418 from last week's 479.




## ENEMY KILLED IN ACTION

declined from last week's 2,692 to 2,250.



## SOUTH VIETNAMESE EFFECTIVENESS

as measured by the percentage of enemy killed by GVN forces rose to 80% from the 70% of last week.



Statistics for the latest week shown are preliminary

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

Enemy Activity

25X1D1a

In South Vietnam, enemy-initiated activity during the past week remained at fairly high levels throughout Military Region 1, with the heaviest fighting again centered around Quang Tri City. [REDACTED]

25X1D1a  
NSA [REDACTED] the enemy may at- NSA  
tempt to employ armor against the defenses of Hue and in the lowlands of Quang Ngai Province, but so far no tanks have been detected in positions from which such attacks could be launched. In other parts of the country, military activity has been at a comparatively low level. The enemy threat to the upper Delta region of MR 4 has been increased somewhat, however, by the movement of the headquarters of the VC 5th Division and at least one subordinate regiment to Base Area 470 in western Dinh Tuong Province. The arrival of these units puts at least four enemy infantry regiments and one artillery regiment either in or near that base area. In the lower Delta, there has also been an increase of enemy strength during the week in southwestern Chuong Thien Province. These developments suggest that the enemy may be planning to launch -- some time in the near future -- a coordinated surge of attacks in both the upper and lower Delta.

Enemy forces in Cambodia increased shelling attacks in the Siem Reap area during the week, but there were no significant ground assaults. Along Route 1, in the Kompong Trabek area, the Communists reacted sharply over the weekend to the recent capture (24 July) of that town by a joint ARVN/FANK force. The Communists launched a strong armored assault against friendly forces expanding their gains around Kompong Trabek. Some 17 tanks are reported to have been damaged or destroyed by FANK or U.S. tactical air support. The enemy will probably attempt to continue his attacks in this area, as a strong grip on Route 1 by friendly forces poses a potential threat to the supply lines leading to Communist troops in the upper Delta region of GVN MR 4.

In north Laos, a two-battalion NVA attack dislodged six irregular battalions southwest of the Plaine des Jarres. Farther south in the Panhandle, friendly forces recovered a village near Seno lost to the enemy last week; otherwise, the tactical situation remains the same. There are indications, however, that NVA units are relocating to renew attacks against friendly units northeast and east of Pakse.

Enemy Infiltration and Logistics

Personnel infiltration continued at a low level during the week, with one small, special purpose and two regular groups bound for northern South Vietnam detected in North Vietnam. The estimate of infiltrators destined for South Vietnam-Cambodia since 1 October 1971 now stands at some 127,700 - 129,700.

Rail shipments to North Vietnam continue to be reflected in intercepted communications with references to explosives and petroleum products from the Soviet Union; vehicles, foodstuffs, petroleum, and communications equipment from Communist China; and sheet iron from Hungary. Hanoi, furthermore, has requested an unusually large delivery of foodstuffs from China during August -- 102,000 tons compared to 55,000 tons for July. The large August request may indicate an attempt to make up for shortfalls in deliveries for the preceding several months. Given Hanoi's serious concern over the condition of the dike system, however, it could signify an effort to stockpile foodstuffs as insurance against the possibility that a significant portion of the autumn rice harvest might be lost as a result of flooding. The POL pipeline system from China into North Vietnam appears to have been completed, but evidence is not yet available to confirm that it is operational. To the south, recent evidence indicates that the Communists are working to expand their logistic corridor through western MR 1 and to extend it within South Vietnam down into the highlands of MR 2. Furthermore, despite poor weather in Laos and northern Cambodia, the movement and stockpiling of supplies and evidence of engineering work already underway suggest that the Communists are attempting to prepare for an early start of dry season logistics operations through Laos.

~~Top Secret~~